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Unfashioned creatures, but half made up: Beginning with Mary Shelley's Spectre 
 
Abstract:  This paper uses Derrida’s work Politics of Friendship to interrogate the 
concept of the “friend” in the educational and fictional writings of Mary Shelley, William 
Godwin and Mary Wiollstonecraft. It concludes with a reading of A Vindication of the 
Rights of Woman, which argues that a certain wager on the possibility friendship 
rhetorically structures Wollstonecraft’s text. The argument about friendship and 
education mounted in this paper leads on to my account of what elsewhere I have called 
otogogy.  
     * 
 
Keywords: Derrida. Deconstruction. Educational Theory. Mary Shelley. Frankenstein. 
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Studies. Literary criticism. Literary theory.  
 
     *  
 
Beginning with Mary Shelley’s spectre. ‘Respect for the spectre, as Mary Shelley 
would say.’1 ‘All phenomena of friendship, all things and all beings to be loved, belong 
to spectrality. “It is necessary to love” means: the spectres, they are to be loved; the 
spectre must be respected (we know that Mary Shelley brought our attention to the 
anagram that makes the spectre in respect become visible again).’ (PF. 288) Would she? 
Did she? The reference, obviously, is to Frankenstein. Mary Shelley’s fate, as a writer, 
has always been to be a one-novel author. Hard fate in itself, when she wrote so much. 
But her fate has also been to have that unique achievement, of being ‘the Author of 
Frankenstein’ ascribed to the presence, the too brief presence, the animating presence of 
canonical male poets, Byron, and above all Shelley, the man whose name she took. 
‘Nothing but the magnetizing of her brain by Shelley’s can account for her having risen 
so far above her usual self as in Frankenstein.’ So wrote Richard Garnett in his 
introduction to her short-stories in 1891.
2
 Frankenstein has always been a novel treated as 
a special case of magnetism and of animation: the elevation above her usual (natural?) 
 2 
sphere of a woman by a masculine genius, her ‘guide, philosopher, and friend.’ That’s 
what one contemporary review calls P. B. Shelley (her ‘guide, philosopher, and friend’), 
before proceeding to suggest that P. B. Shelley actually may have written Frankenstein 
himself.
3
 
 ‘[W]e know that Mary Shelley brought our attention to the anagram that makes 
the spectre in respect become visible again.’ Is Derrida referring to the Preface to the 
1818 edition of the novel? ‘The event on which the interest of the story depends is 
exempt from the disadvantages of a mere tale of specters and enchantment.’4 If this is the 
reference Derrida is referring to then he is perhaps unaware that he is actually quoting P. 
B. Shelley. Mary Shelley, we can be reasonably sure, wrote the following passage, 
however
5
: 
 
I then reflected, and the thought made me shiver, that the creature whom I had left in my 
apartment might still be there, alive, and walking about. I dreaded to behold this monster 
…. I threw the door forcibly open, as children are accustomed to do when they expect a 
spectre to stand in waiting for them on the other side; but nothing appeared. (F. 88) 
 
We know what Derrida is writing (originally talking) about, even if the sudden presence 
(on two different occasions) of Mary Shelley and her novel appears somewhat eccentric. 
The spectre, and the anagrammatical relation of the spectre to respect, and the monster 
and its etymological relation to demonstration, to the exhibition of the host or of sacred 
relics, divine portents and warnings. The spectre, like the monster, is something we see 
but which questions presence. It is also, we should add, this monster, something 
malformed, misshapen at birth, untimely. The monster is, then, associated with abortions, 
with that which is abortive and abhorred: ‘God in pity made man beautiful and alluring, 
after his own image; but my form is a filthy type of your’s, more horrid from its very 
resemblance.’ (F.155) But the creature is very rarely a spectre. It (he) is on one page of 
Chapter 6 Volume 1 an ‘object,’ a ‘wretch,’ a ‘filthy daemon,’ ‘the murderer of my 
brother,’ a ‘figure,’ a ‘devil,’ a ‘depraved wretch.’ Elsewhere he (it) is associated with, or 
described in relation to, a vampire, a mummy, a ‘vile insect.’ One could compile quite a 
list; filth, being filthy, a filthy abortion, always figuring high in that list.
6
 But more often 
than not, he, along with his creator, comes back to the term ‘fiend.’ The creature is a 
 3 
‘fiend.’ So that it is possible to state, quite clearly and categorically, that the real lexical 
relation in this novel occurs between the alliterative fiend and friend. The word friend 
(including its negation) is employed over 120 times in the 1818 version; the word fiend 
approximately 40 times.
7
 Friend/enemy; friend/fiend; freund/feind: Frankenstein is a 
novel which employs the very antithesis which structures Derrida’s book. Did Derrida 
have a sense of quite how appropriate his reaching over to this most famous of British 
Romantic novels actually was? 
 Frankenstein, as many of its commentators have noticed over the years, is a novel 
about fraternity. Eve Kosofky Sedgwick’s suggestion that the novel displays the violence 
generated by what she calls male homosocial desire seems particularly telling in the light 
of Politics of Friendship.
8
 It’s a novel about politics, about the political sphere. 
Master/slave, friend/fiend, freund/feind, play out a fictional account of the political 
sphere in which male desire (for the friend, the friend always male) results in ‘absolute 
hostility.’ In the frame it also plays itself out between Walton and Frankenstein, this 
search for the friend, and for the friend to be the friend. Walton writing to his sister, who 
does not appear, who is merely addressed (apostrophized, in the epistolary mode): ‘You 
may deem me romantic, my dear sister, but I bitterly feel the want of a friend.’ (F. 53) 
‘[A]nd I greatly need a friend who would have sense enough not to despise me as 
romantic, and affection enough for me to endeavour to regulate my mind.’ (ibid) ‘One 
day I mentioned to him [Walton to Victor] the desire I had always felt of finding a friend 
who might sympathize with me, and direct me by his counsel.’ And Victor replies: ‘I 
agree with you … in believing that friendship is not only desirable, but a possible 
acquisition. I once had a friend, the most noble of human creatures, and am entitled, 
therefore, to judge respecting friendship.’ (F. 61) Frankenstein is indeed entitled. He is 
the sovereign, the Victor, the monarch. ‘No hospitality, in the classic sense,’ writes 
Derrida in Of Hospitality: 
 
without sovereignty of oneself over one’s home, but since there is also no hospitality 
without finitude, sovereignty can only be exercised by filtering, choosing, and thus by 
excluding and doing violence. Injustice, a certain injustice, and even a certain perjury, 
begins right away, from the very threshold of the right of hospitality.
9
 
 
 4 
And so he, Victor, knows what friendship (between men) is: he once had Henry Clerval, 
who now is dead, murdered by his, Victor’s, own creation. Frankenstein is about politics, 
politics and friendship, fraternity, and absolute hostility. It is about hospitality and the 
exclusion of a European spectre, a European monster.
10
 The creature is a European, in the 
sense that he is made out of dead European humans and animals. He is a European and he 
is not: just as he is a man and is not. Derrida writes of being in part European and in part 
not and he associates his question with the question of hospitality: hospitality is a 
question, a political question: 
 
If, to conclude, I declared that I feel European among other things, would this be, in this 
very declaration, to be more or less European? Both, no doubt. Let the consequences be 
drawn from this. It is up to the others in any case, and up to me among them, to decide.
11
 
 
It is never up to the monster qua monster to decide, however. Or rather, it is only possible 
for him to decide in the negative. That’s the politics of the novel Frankenstein, as we well 
know. ‘I was benevolent and good; misery made me a fiend. Make me happy, and I shall 
again be virtuous’ (F.126), or as P. B. Shelley put it in his review of the novel: ‘—Treat a 
person ill and he will become wicked.’12 Virtue and happiness are predicated at that 
moment on the creation of a woman, a female. And yet, as we know, if we read the novel 
carefully enough, the female creature will not provide virtue and happiness for the male 
creature: 
 
What I ask of you is reasonable and moderate; I demand a creature of another sex, but as 
hideous as myself: the gratification is small, but it is all I can receive, and it shall content 
me. It is true, we shall be monsters, cut off from all the world; but on that account we 
shall be more attached to each other. Our lives will not be happy, but they will be 
harmless, and free from the misery I now feel. Oh! my creator, make me happy; let me 
feel gratitude towards you for one benefit! Let me see that I excite the sympathy of some 
existing thing; do not deny me my request! (F. 170) 
 
We will not be happy: O, creator, make me happy. Make me happy by doing that thing 
which will not make me happy. The greatest and most prolonged misreading of the novel 
comes into play here (i.e. that the creature’s desires will be fulfilled—resolved, 
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answered—in the creation of a mate). The recognition of this misreading keeps us close 
to Derrida and friendship. The female creature is all the male creature can realistically 
hope for. The female creature will not make him (and her)—them (‘we’)—happy because 
she is not capable of being the friend. Only Victor is capable of that. Make me happy, 
says his creature, by for once being my friend (instead of my enemy) and making me a 
creature with which/whom I will not be able to find friendship and thus happiness. ‘The 
figure of the absolute enemy … starts to resemble that of the absolute friend: the deadliest 
tragedy of fratricide.’ (PF. 151) The friend appears to be a doppelganger, as here in 
Montaigne’s description: ‘In the friendship which I am talking about, souls are mingled 
and confounded in so universal a blending that they efface the seam which joins them 
together so that it cannot be found.’ And again, talking of the death of La Boëtie: ‘I was 
already so used and accustomed to being, in everything, one of two, that I now feel I am 
no more than a half.’13 True friendship as brotherhood. No friend in the feminine. Unless. 
Unless, Derrida wonders, pondering on Schmitt, ‘what if she were the absolute enemy of 
this theory of the absolute enemy, the spectre of hostility to be conjured up for the sake of 
the sworn brothers, or the other of the absolute enemy who has become the absolute 
enemy that would not even be recognized in a regular war?’ (PF.157) Too terrible to 
contemplate, at least for those who seek for friends and war against enemies. And for 
those who eventually find their friends in their sworn enemies and their enemies in their 
sworn friends. A masculine scene. Fraternity and fratricide. Frankenstein is, frankly, a 
novel about fraternal warfare. A war which appears to rage over filthy materiality, 
without (and yet, since we’re reading a novel, in that sense with) frankness. 
Frankenstein’s fault is that he is not frank enough. He is, to be brutal, frankless, since to 
be frankless is to become brutal. 
 And yet all along this speed-camera shot of the novel and the attempt, in relation 
to Derrida’s book, to begin with Mary Shelley, we cannot help notice that friendship is 
not merely the medium of this politics and this warfare. Friendship is also the name for a 
form of legitimate animation. A spiritual animation which the Germans tend to call 
bildung, and the English of the novel: instruction, pedagogy, informing, education, 
teaching, and so on. The androcentric friendship which is sought for throughout the book 
concerns education. This is clear from any serious reading. It is re-emphasized by Mary 
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Shelley in the 1831 version of the text when she adds a little more to the answering 
statement of Victor I have already cited: ‘we are unfashioned creatures, but half made up, 
if one wiser, better, dearer than ourselves—such a friend ought to be—do not lend his aid 
to perfectionate our weak and faulty natures. [I once had a friend ….]’ (F. 319) 
Beginning with Mary Shelley introduces a topic into the philosophical enquiry on 
friendship which is not directly discussed by Derrida. The friend is male and is a teacher. 
Or rather, the friend, as we know from Enlightenment philosophy, and in particular from 
Rousseau, is someone who teaches without taking up the power-position of the teacher. 
The friend is the teacher in the enlightened disappearance of all teachers. And this 
teacher, who is not a teacher but a friend, completes you, makes you One, informs or 
fashions you into Being. 
 This at least is what Godwin, Mary Shelley’s father, tried to argue throughout his 
philosophical and literary career. It is an idea that is discernible, in one way or another, in 
all the philosophical texts on friendship Derrida reads in his book: the Lysis, the 
Nichomachean Ethics, Cicero, Montaigne, Nietzsche, on to Ferenczi’s stunning letter to 
Freud and beyond. I will call it an Enlightenment idea, however. The androcentric ideal 
of enlightenment through friendship. Animation, informing, without hierarchy and thus 
without power. Although, from the beginning, this thought (of the friend) is full of 
problems and contradictions, since how can friends, true friends, friends in equality, let us 
say—brothers, let us say—fulfill, one for the other, or both for each other, the role of 
teacher, which from Aristotle on we would associate with the filial, with ‘friendships of 
superiority’ or, if this is a teaching outside of the home, with friendships of utility, or 
maybe even pleasure, as opposed to friendships of character or ‘primary’ friendship?14 
How can teaching and friendship be brought together without the discordance of need, 
which Kant finds so ‘dangerous’ and disruptive of friendship?15 How can teaching occur 
in the context of primary friendship, the one-soul-within-two bodies kind of friendship 
described by Cicero, Montaigne, and indeed by P. B. Shelley in his ‘On Love’?16 How 
could a division in that ‘one soul in bodies twain’ (a need, a lack, a desire for completion) 
speak for anything but the collapse of that ideal of true friendship? The issue is, as we 
know, already discussed in the Lysis just after it had seemed as if the attraction of ‘like 
for like’ was to provide the much sought-after definition of friendship.17 
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The topic is fascinating in Godwin since Godwin is one of the Enlightenment 
philosophers who makes an authentic attempt to think a teaching with equality. He 
attacks Rousseau for merely pretending to be on a level of equality with his pupil: ‘[H]is 
whole system,’ he writes, ‘is a series of tricks, a puppet-show exhibition, of which the 
master holds the wires, and the scholar is never to suspect in what manner they are 
moved.’18 The question is crucial for Godwin, since we cannot hope ever to have 
democracy if we inform our children, our pupils, our citizens through compromised and 
insincere modes of trickery. Any one who has read Political Justice will know that 
sincerity (frankness) as the direct rendering of reason is hugely important to Godwin’s 
political philosophy. It is, for him, perhaps the emblem of a liberated, rational polity. 
Godwin writes: 
 
Where the parent is not prepared to grant a real and bona fide equality, it is of the utmost 
importance that he should avoid the semblance of it. Do not open a treaty as between 
independent states, when you are both able and willing to treat the neighbour-state as a 
conquered province. (E. 122) 
 
But parents should be prepared to grant a real equality between themselves and their 
children, or those they are entrusted to teach. Parents and teachers should be frank, 
completely frank. Everyone should be in a position of equality, this is the end-point 
towards which any rational political action tends. Godwin expresses his vision of 
education as a kind of friendly perambulation, a leading and following which we cannot 
help but read as a benevolent version of that dialectical master-slave fight to the death 
that those frankless characters, creator and creature, enter into in the last volume of his 
daughter’s novel: 
 
According to the received modes of education, the master goes first, and the pupil 
follows. According to the method here recommended, it is probable that the pupil should 
go first, and the master follow. If I learn nothing but what I desire to learn, what should 
hinder me from being my own preceptor? (E. 115)
19
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Disappearance of the teacher in the oneness of equality, frankness, friendship. But is 
equality ever equal to oneness? And can teaching ever escape from superiority, from 
hierarchy? Well, for now? no. In the text I am briefly discussing here there is frequent use 
of the figure of the for now, what Godwin elsewhere famously calls ‘things as they are.’ 
For now there can be no friend, for now there can be only teachers, and power-relations, 
and what I have elsewhere (reading Godwin, amongst others) styled in-forming:
20
 
 
All education is despotism. It is perhaps impossible for the young to be conducted 
without introducing in many cases the tyranny of implicit obedience. Go there; do that; 
read; write; lie down; will perhaps for ever be the language addressed to youth by age. (E. 
107) 
 
For now, and perhaps for always. Perhaps. Perhaps not.  
 There are other reasons why Godwin’s educational friend will not arrive, may not 
arrive. He, for Godwin, is a he. One has to do, quite literally, with the manner of his 
arrival. The problem is one that readers of Derrida are quite familiar with. The problem 
has to do with institution. Godwin writes: 
 
There is no ‘divinity that hedges’ the man of genius. There is no guardian spirit 
that accompanies him through life. If you tell me that you are one of those who 
are qualified to instruct and guide mankind, it may be that I admit it; but I may 
reasonably ask, When did you become so, and how long has this been your 
character? (E. 94) 
 
If all education is ‘despotism’ how does any one ever come out of that experience without 
being in-formed, malformed, misshapen? How can that man who would arrive and be our 
friend (and thus complete us, make us whole and One) be a friend when he did not 
himself have such a friend to guide and inform, rather than in-form, him? The classic 
problem of revolution, of democracy, of justice, of enlightenment.  
 But there’s another related problem, expressed most dramatically in Political 
Justice. The problem concerns Godwin’s assertion that every human being has reason. 
That the rational faculty lies there, to be rendered, in every human individual’s private 
judgement. This is the foundation of all Godwin’s philosophy (politically, pedagogically) 
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in every area he touches upon (and he touches upon most). It is this area of Godwin’s 
philosophical writings which appears to bring us closest to his daughter’s famous novel. 
Godwin writes: 
 
If there be any man who is incapable of making inferences for himself, or of 
understanding, when stated in the most explicit terms, the inferences of another, him we 
consider as an abortive production, and not in strictness belonging to the human species. 
It is absurd therefore to say that sound reasoning and truth cannot be communicated by 
one man to another.
21
 
 
How do abortive men ever come into existence? We are, I need to tell you, working 
backwards here, reading the substantial additions Godwin made to the opening chapters 
of his philosophical and political masterpiece in 1796 and 1798. The chapter we’re 
reading (very quickly) is retitled in these editions ‘The Characters of Men Originate in 
Their External Circumstances.’ Godwin is an Enlightenment philosopher and his belief in 
reason steams from following in the footsteps of Locke and the array of Enlightenment 
philosophers who succeeded him. ‘What is born into the world,’ he writes, ‘is an 
unfinished sketch, without character or decisive feature impressed upon it …. There is for 
the most part no essential difference between the child of the lord and of the porter.’ (P 4. 
21) For the most part. Is it external circumstances, then, that make abortive men? Well 
Godwin recognizes that if we accept the theory of environmentalism we also have to 
accept a certain incalculability, an incalculability born, as we’ll see, from the recognition 
that birth is not the beginning: 
 
Education can never be equal. The inequality of external circumstances in two beings 
whose situations most nearly resemble is so great as to baffle all power of calculation. In 
the present state of mankind this is eminently the case. (P 4. 22) 
 
For now, in the present state of things. But this need not continue: we can imagine 
another state of mankind:  
 
The essential differences that are to be found between individual and individual originate 
in the opinions they form, and the circumstances by which they are controlled. It is 
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impossible to believe that the same moral train would not make nearly the same man. 
(ibid) 
 
And yet Godwin is enough of a philosopher to recognize that if we take environmentalist 
arguments seriously we have to start, unlike Locke and others, with the first environment: 
‘at the moment of birth,’ he states, ‘man has really a certain character, and each man a 
character different from his fellows. The accidents which pass during the months of 
percipiency in the womb of the mother produce a real effect.’ (P 4. 23) Godwin does not 
like his logical inference; he wishes, as we will see, to obliterate it; he wishes to believe 
that experience after birth obliterates it. But we have been reading backwards, and it is 
not too difficult to see that it is in the womb that abortive men are created. Godwin 
writes: 
 
If the early impressions of our childhood may by a skilful observer be as it were 
obliterated almost as soon as made, how much less can the confused and unpronounced 
impressions of the womb be expected to resist the multiplicity of ideas that successively 
contribute to wear out their traces? (ibid) 
 
The womb is confusing, causes confusion, and it speaks a language we must, necessarily, 
consider as alien: that’s how I interpret ‘unpronounced.’ It produces ‘impressions’ which 
must be obliterated if the friend is to arrive, if equality and the calculable ends of reason 
are ever to be achieved. Godwin adds the following: 
 
How long has the genius of education been disheartened and unnerved by the pretence 
that man is born all that it is possible for him to become? How long has the jargon 
imposed upon the world which would persuade us that in instructing a man you do not 
add to, but unfold his stores? The miscarriages of education do not proceed from the 
boundedness of its powers, but from the mistakes with which it is accomplished. (P 4. 23-
4) 
 
The creature, in Mary Shelley’s novel, you will be remembering here, was not born of 
woman. What is the difference between a womb and a workshop of filthy creation? Must 
the friend who can teach without being the teacher provide an improved womb to 
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obliterate the original womb? Godwin writes in The Enquirer: ‘When a child is born, one 
of the earliest purposes of his institutor ought to be, to awaken his mind, to breathe a soul 
into the, as yet, unformed mass.’ (E. 84) The friend who will come, the friend who will 
complete us and make us whole and One, is, it would appear, a brother, and a life-giver, 
an animator. He sounds like a God to me. ‘There is no friendship, at least in this primary 
sense, with animals or with gods. There is no friendship, either, between animals and 
gods.’ (PF. 198) A god-like man with a supplemental, artificial or at least masculine 
womb. Or should we say an anti-womb? Is that what Enlightenment education is? an anti-
womb? An anti-womb which obliterates the traces of the maternal, the natural, originary 
womb? A womb (rational and pronounced: frank, communicative, undeniable) hostile to 
the womb?  
 Sisters, if there are any, are a species of the genus brother. (PF.156) 
 … what is a friend in the feminine, and who, in the feminine, is her friend? (PF. 
56) 
 So where are we? We friends? We educators? In the senses I have been 
suggesting regarding the friend today, what are, for us, the politics of friendship? We 
cannot answer those questions from the outside. We know this. But this means, we cannot 
simply dismiss the idea of the friend Godwin presents to us and which Mary Shelley’s 
fictional characters live in the absence of. 
 Philosophies of education in the modern period, at least since Locke, and no doubt 
before him, mix their political categories, so that a benevolent monarchy (which we today 
might call pedagogy) finally gives way to a democratic (or proto-democratic) equality in 
reason, adulthood, maturity, enlightenment. ‘From the nursery to the academy,’ to adapt 
an early sentence in the Lysis. The movement is often, but not always, one from the filial 
to the social, from the private to the public: maturation; the idea of adulthood and 
citizenship and thus, the possibility of friendship. The opening sections of Locke’s Some 
Thoughts Concerning Education are probably still the classic expression of this 
movement (I say mixing) from monarchy to democracy.
22
 The problem is, of course, 
where do you draw the line? Once you have let sovereign power into education where 
and when do you then get rid of it, transcend it, move beyond it? How can you have two 
political models working side-by-side to reflect, analogically represent, isomorphicly 
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structure a process—education—which ultimately must support, reflect, exemplify, be a 
part of the (the one) political structure? This impossible situation becomes suddenly very 
visible around Rousseau. The brilliance of Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein is that it gives us 
a fully animated, adult child and thus makes the two discourses on education come 
crashing into each other at the creature’s birth. That creature—monster/abortion/ 
fiend/slave/spectre—who has so often been read (at least analogically) as feminine. 
Without, perhaps, recognizing that the greatest example of the uncanny it offers to the 
reader is that it might become itself a teacher: 
 
At this time a slight sleep relieved me from the pain of reflection, which was disturbed by 
the approach of a beautiful child, who came running into the recess I had chosen, with all 
the sportiveness of infancy. Suddenly, as I gazed on him, an idea seized me that this little 
creature was unprejudiced, and had lived too short a time to have imbibed a horror of 
deformity. If, therefore, I could seize him and educate him as my companion and friend, I 
should not be so desolate in this peopled earth. (F. 137-8) 
 
This is little William, whom the creature will murder. Just as Frankenstein will murder 
the unfinished, half made up, female creature who, being an abortion, the male creature 
may not be able to teach: ‘she, who in all probability was to become a thinking and 
reasoning animal, might refuse to comply with a compact made before her creation.’ (F. 
190)  
 Frankenstein is (represents, makes monstrous) the scene of instruction. For Mary 
Shelley, for Godwin, for us. Us teachers, as we speak, to our pupils, are all, for now, 
brothers. Teaching is an androcentric scene. Friendship in teaching, however, enters 
teaching when there are sisters, and/or when there is a feminine side to speech and action. 
The creature is not feminine, neither is he (it) simply masculine: he (it) is simply 
someone who needs a friend that will not come and who cannot be a friend to others. For 
us, for now, the scene of instruction is this scene. ‘O my friends, there is no friend.’ In the 
vocative and the dative, the canonical and the recoil version, this phrase is the phrase 
which best sums up Frankenstein as I have been reading it; as the scene of instruction—
for you and me, my friends. There can be no friend without sisters. No liberty, equality, 
fraternity, without sisters. No democracy without sisters. 
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Woman was not man, a man free and capable of friendship, and not only of love. Well 
now, neither is man a man. Not yet. And why not? Because he is not yet generous 
enough, because he does not know how to give to the other. To attain to this infinite gift, 
failing which there is no friendship, one must know how to give to the enemy. And of 
this, neither woman nor man (up until now) is capable …. Neither one (nor yet, until 
now) is one of these true brothers, these friends or enemies, these friends qua possible 
enemies, those whom Zarathustra nevertheless already, starting now, addresses and 
appeals to (teleiopoetically). (PF. 283) 
 
And what of the mother? If the friend arrived, if friendship were possible, would the 
mother be a sister or a father? Could there ever be friendship with a/the Mother? Does the 
Mother ever speak? Can we ever speak for and of her? 
 There are no mothers in Derrida’s The Politics of Friendship. But then, there are 
no women authors either. Save for a few references, two of which have made us (me) 
begin with Mary Shelley. What there is, in Derrida’s book, is the idea of woman, of 
women. The idea of sisters, friends to other women, friends to other men. Spectres all. 
But in the scenario I’ve been presenting to you today there is a mother, although for Mary 
Shelley she was always, from the beginning, spectral: there, whilst being absent, in 
books, in paintings, in one other child (fashioned from another father), and in graveyards 
not more than a short walk from here. And this mother spoke, rationally, philosophically, 
about the possibility of arriving, the possibility of being here, as a woman, and as a 
friend. Teleiopoetically: in the language of perhaps. And a reading of Derrida’s The 
Politics of Friendship can give us this: a reading of the mother’s most famous text in 
terms of teleiopoesis, in terms of specters and of the perhaps. 
 Running throughout A Vindication of the Rights of Woman is a rhetoric of the 
wager, the gamble, a throw of the dice. A speculation, if you will. A gamble or wager, 
along, of course, with a call for friendship. The Vindication is primarily, principally, 
beyond any thing else, a call for friendship. ‘[T]he woman who strengthens her body and 
exercises her mind will, by managing her family and practicising various virtues, become 
the friend, and not the humble dependent of her husband.’23 ‘The most holy bond of 
society is friendship. It has been well said, by a shrew artist, “that rare as true love is, true 
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friendship is still rarer.”’ (V. 139) ‘Friendship is a serious affection; the most sublime of 
all affections, because it is founded on principle, and cemented by time. The very reverse 
may be said of love. In a great degree, love and friendship cannot subsist in the same 
bosom….’ (V. 192) We need to let Wollstonecraft’s voice into our dialogue on 
friendship. On the politics of friendship. The voice of a woman calling for friendship, a 
politics of friendship. So, some more: ‘When women are sufficiently enlightened to 
discover their real interest, on a grand scale, they will, I am persuaded, be very ready to 
resign all the prerogatives of love, that are not mutual, speaking of them as lasting 
prerogatives, for the calm satisfaction of friendship ….’ (V. 229-30) ‘Were women more 
rationally educated, could they take a more comprehensive view of things, they would be 
contented to love but once in their lives; and after marriage calmly let passion subside 
into friendship ….’ (V. 249) And some more: ‘But, I presuppose, that such a degree of 
equality should be established between the sexes as would shut out gallantry and 
coquetry, yet allow friendship and love to temper the heart for the discharge of the higher 
duties. These would be schools of morality ….’ (V. 312), ‘the main pillars of friendship, 
are respect and confidence—esteem is never founded on it cannot tell what’ (V. 308), ‘for 
children will never be properly educated till friendship subsists between parents. Virtue 
flies from a house divided against itself—and a whole legion of devils take up their 
residence there.’ (V. 341) 
 The Vindication of the Rights of Woman is a call for friendship if friendship 
between the sexes is possible. It is a call for equality between the sexes if equality 
between the sexes is possible. Frequently, instead of asking the question about equality 
Wollstonecraft opens the question itself to view
24
: 
 
when morality shall be settled on a more solid basis, then, without being gifted with a 
prophetic spirit, I will venture to predict that woman will be either the friend or slave of 
man.  
 
It apparently, states Wollstonecraft, could go either way: 
 
We shall not, as at present, doubt whether she is a moral agent, or the link which unites 
man with brutes. But, should it then appear, that like the brutes they [women] were 
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principally created for the use of man, he will let them patiently bite the bridle, and not 
mock them with empty praise; or, should their rationality be proved, he will not impede 
their improvement merely to gratify his sensual desires. (V. 146)
25
 
 
It is yet to be proved (whether women are rational creatures or not), although the very 
text we are reading is proving it as we read it. Proof of women’s rationality is in the 
distance, in the future, and thus so is equality, although that future-time is being directly 
addressed by the text. Again: 
 
It is time to effect a revolution in female manners—time to restore to them their lost 
dignity—and make them, as part of the human species, labour by reforming themselves to 
reform the world. It is time to separate unchangeable morals from local manners.—If men 
be demi-gods—why let us serve them! And if the dignity of the female soul be as 
disputable as that of animals—if their reason does not afford sufficient light to direct their 
conduct whilst unerring instinct is denied—they are surely of all creatures the most 
miserable! and, bent beneath the iron hand of destiny, must submit to be a fair defect in 
creation. (p.158)
26
  
 
It would make no logical sense that women were inferior in reason and had no divine 
soul: and yet, if they are defective in reason and have no divine soul, then so be it. The 
issue is that they might have both, perhaps. Again: 
 
I come round to my old argument: if woman be allowed to have an immortal soul, she 
must have, as the employment of life, an understanding to match. And when, to render 
the present state more complete, though every thing proves it to be but a fraction of a 
mighty sum, she is incited by present gratifications to forget her grand destination, nature 
is counteracted, or she was born only to procreate and rot. (V. 180) 
 
Derrida’s work on the politics of friendship allows us to look at these moments again. 
What we might notice about them, apart from the if this…then that satirical use of an 
inherited logic, is that they are, with regard to women, with regard to the idea of 
friendship between men and women (so crucial to the arguments in the text) future-
oriented. Perhaps there will be rational women. Perhaps there will be intellectual 
equality between the sexes. Perhaps there will be friendship between men and women, 
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and even between women and women.
27
 Perhaps there will be a democracy which lives 
up to its name. Wollstonecraft writes: ‘Rousseau exerts himself to prove that all was 
right: a crowd of authors that all is now right: and I, that all will be right.’ (V. 121) There 
is a teleiopoetic dimension to the Vindication which, once we are attuned to it, speaks to 
us as friends, friends who might hear the call, friends who might arrive. ‘The friends of 
the perhaps are the friends of truth,’ Derrida writes. ‘But the friends of truth are not, by 
definition, in the truth …. The truth—that of the thinkers to come—it is impossible to be 
it, to be there, to have it; one must only be its friend.’ (PF. 43) 
 Teleiopoesis is inevitable in a writer like Wollstonecraft (and what does ‘like’ 
mean here?) because she is a writer who knows that equality and friendship will only 
come if they are wagered. She writes, near the end of her text (but the gesture is repeated 
throughout): ‘the only method of leading women to fulfil their peculiar duties, is to free 
them from all restraint by allowing them to participate [in] the inherent rights of 
mankind.’ (V. 320) ‘Inherent’ here is highly ironic, of course. It speaks to the fact of male 
rights, of primogeniture and all the baroque paraphernalia of aristocratic and propertied 
male right, but it also speaks to the fact that it [rights, human rights, the ‘rights of 
mankind’ including woman] does not yet exist. What will make the ‘inherent’ rights of 
man exist is if men allow women to participate in them. ‘Make them free,’ Wollstonecraft 
adds, ‘and they will quickly become wise and virtuous, as men become more so.’28 Make 
women free and there might be freedom, even for men. Make women equal and there 
might be equality. Make women friends and there might be friendship. Wollstonecraft 
adds, a little later: ‘The conclusion which I wish to draw, is obvious: make women 
rational creatures, and free citizens, and they will quickly become good wives, and 
mothers; that is—if men do not neglect the duties of husbands and fathers.’ (V. 323) It 
might be, perhaps, that women are rational creatures equal in intellect to men: make them 
equal and there might then be equality and they (and ‘we’) might then be equal. Equality 
and freedom, in the Vindication, are a wager, teleiopoetically addressed to the reader. 
Friendship (between and within men and women) is a part of, and yet also the foundation 
of, this wager, this speculation, this address in respect of the spectre, the friend who can 
be seen and who might arrive. Equality, freedom, friendship are teleiopoetically 
grounded, in the Vindication, on their possibility, to come. Despite Wollstonecraft’s 
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complex play with arguments founded on nature and on divinity, it is the future, and in 
particular, the future friend to which her argument is addressed and on which it is 
founded.  
 The chapter I have been discussing in part (a few sentences from its conclusion) is 
entitled: ‘On National Education.’ We have not, despite appearances, left education 
behind. ‘Who could ever answer for a discourse on friendship without taking a stand?’ 
(PF. 228) There were for Mary Shelley, along with her father and mother, more than 
enough enemies to take a stand against: there are also enough for us. More than enough. 
‘If there were a single thesis to this essay, it would posit that there could be no choice: the 
decision would once again consist in deciding without excluding, in the invention of 
other names and other concepts, in moving out beyond this politics without ceasing to 
intervene therein to transform it.’ (PF.158-9) Godwin, the father, and Wollstonecraft, the 
mother, know that the text (whether it is a novel or a philosophical or political treatise) 
speaks to what might come. The text in that sense is a friend, speaking to someone who 
might be able to read it and sign for it, and thus be the friend. The friend, the one who 
might teach without teaching, who might animate without completing or even originating, 
who might inform without in-forming: the friend is always the one who will come, 
perhaps. The next chapter in the Vindication is entitled: ‘Some Instances of the Folly 
Which the Ignorance of Women Generates; With Concluding Reflections on the Moral 
Improvement That A Revolution in Female Manners Might Naturally Be Expected to 
Produce.’ Might Naturally. Naturally perhaps. The title, this sentence, like the title of the 
text as a whole, like the text as a whole, is itself a friend, a teleiopoetic call for those who 
might arrive. For those who might respond. For those who might realize the call for 
friendship. A Vindication of the Rights of Woman. ‘(it begins at the end, it is initiated with 
the signature of the other).’ (PF. 32) Teleiopoesis: the ear of the other signing: otogogy.29 
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